Introduction
When a remote user requests a service provider's server resources in a client/server scheme over an insecure channel, the server needs to authenticate the legitimacy of the user. Under a user authentication protocol, the server can verify and determine whether its resources should be provided to the user. This kind of security mechanism used to establish the trust relationship between the client and server in open environments is referred to as the remote user authentication protocol. In 1981, Lamport proposed a novel password remote user authentication scheme using cryptographic hash functions [6] . In his scheme, the user verification table, which contains the user password verifier, should be securely stored on the server. If the verifier is disclosed, the system will be compromised. To address this issue, a smartcard-based password authentication scheme was proposed by Hwang, Chen, and Laih in 1990 [4] . In their scheme, the service provider server does not require the user password verifier or the user's secret.
The concept of ID-based cryptosystems was first introduced by Shamir in 1984 [9] . The major advantage of an ID-based scheme is simplified key management. Since there are usually multiple servers providing user resources, authentication protocols for a multi-server environment are required. Most password authentication schemes for multi-server environments are based on static ID, so adversaries can use this information to trace and identify the user requests. In 2009, Liao and Wang proposed a secure dynamic ID based remote user authentication scheme for a multi-server environment [7] to preserve user anonymity. Later in 2009, Hsiang and Shih found that Liao and Wang's protocol is susceptible to malicious server/user attack, and vulnerable to insider, masquerade, server spoofing, and registration center spoofing attacks. Plus, their protocol also fails to provide mutual authentication. Hsiang and Shih proposed an improved protocol [2] at the same time. Unfortunately, later in 2010, Chen et al. showed that Hsiang-Shih's scheme cannot withstand user and server impersonation attacks by an insider [1] .
Recently, Sood, Sarje, and Singh proposed a secure dynamic identity-based authentication protocol for multi-server architectures using smart cards [10] , wherein they show security weaknesses of Hsiang and Shih's authentication scheme. Sood et al. found that Hsiang and Shih's protocol is susceptible to replay, impersonation and stolen smartcard attacks. Sood et al also claim their proposed protocol can resolve the aforementioned security flaws while maintaining the merits of Hsiang and Shih's protocol.
A denial-of-service (DoS) or distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack attempts to make a computer resource unavailable to its intended users. In a remote user authentication scheme, servers need to verify the legitimacy of a user before allowing access to server resources. The DoS/DDoS attack exhausts the server's verification ability by sending large amounts of packets or requests. To counter DoS/DDoS attacks, additional network devices such as firewalls, intrusion detection system (IDS), or intrusion prevention system (IPS) can be installed. Unfortunately, because of the constraints of the TCP/IP protocol, DoS/DDoS attacks cannot be defeated completely [3] . To protect server resources, such as the verification or computational abilities of the server from being exhausted in a DoS/DDoS attack, a remote user authentication protocol should provide the server a mechanism to drop packets or requests before the attacker can exhaust the server's resources.
However, we found that Sood et al.'s protocol does not provide any defense mechanism against DoS/DDoS attacks such as resource exhaustion attack. Unfortunately, it will severely affect systems using this kind of cascade style authentication scheme. Moreover, Sood et al.'s protocol is susceptible to smart card vulnerabilities such as power analysis attack from privileged insiders. In the case where one or both of the control server's verification tables are compromised and an insider who also has knowledge of the control server's master secret, the leak of verifier attack or the off-line dictionary attack can be mounted.
The main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate and provide details showing Sood et al.'s protocol as insecure and suffers from the previously mentioned security vulnerabilities. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows; In Section 2, we briefly review Sood et al.'s protocol. Section 3 contains a cryptanalysis of Sood et al.'s protocol and describes our attack scenarios in detail. We provide some brief concluding remarks in Section 4.
Review of Sood et al.'s Protocol
This section reviews Sood et al.'s dynamic identity based authentication protocol for multi-server architecture using smart cards [10] .
Notations
The notations used in this review are summarized as follows.
Random nonce value generated by U i 's smart card  N 2 Random nonce value generated by S k  N 3 Random nonce value generated by CS  H One-way hash function   Bitwise XOR operation  || String concatenation operation
Sood et al.'s protocol includes three roles: control server, service provider server, and client user, and four phases: registration, login, authentication and session key agreement, and password change.
Registration phase
As shown in Fig.1 , the following steps are performed during the registration phase.
(1) User U i selects blind factor b i , computes both A i = H(ID i ||b i ) and B i = H(b i PW i ), and submits A i and B i to the control server CS via a secure channel. 
Login phase
This phase is invoked whenever U i requests to log on to S k . U i provides his identity ID i *, password PW i *, and the identity of target server SID k * to his smart card device, and the smart card performs the following steps.
(1) U i 's smart card computes E i * = H(ID i *||PW i *)PW i * and checks whether E i * is equal to E i .
(2) The smart card generates nonce N 1 and computes: 
Authentication and session key agreement phase
In this phase, U i and CS authenticate each other, as shown in Fig.2 . Following authentication process, U i , S k , and CS compute their common session key SK respectively. (N 1 N 2 N 3 N 2 N 3 ) ). 
Password change phase

Cryptanalysis of Sood et al.'s protocol
In this section, we present our cryptanalysis of Sood et al.'s protocol.
DoS/DDoS or resource exhaustion attack
Though Sood et al. claim that their protocol withstands replay attack; we found that their scheme does not have any protection mechanism against DoS/DDoS or resource exhaustion attacks by replaying eavesdropped message. Suppose an attacker eavesdrops a login request {SID k , Z i , CID i , M i } corresponding to the legitimate user U i . The attacker can then replay this valid login request message {SID k , Z i , CID i , M i }, verified by the control server CS, to the service provider server S k . Since Sood's protocol does not provide any verification mechanism for S k to authenticate user U i , after appending R i to the message, S k forwards the attacker's replayed message to CS. This flaw allows S k to become an accomplice in a DoS/DDoS attack. After verification, CS computes the common session key SK = H(H(ID i ||y i ||N 1 )|| (N 1 N 2 N 3 ) ) and sends the message {K i , X i , V i , T i } back to S k . After S k verifies CS, S k computes the common session key SK = H(H(ID i ||y i ||N 1 )|| (N 1 N 2 N 3 ) ) and then sends the message {K i , X i , V i , T i } back, but the attacker can just drop the reply or perhaps a spoofed address was supplied. It is trivial that both S k and CS are fooled by the attacker. The attacker can exhaust both of S k 's and CS's resources by sending large amounts of request messages, and thwart legitimate users from accessing S k . To prevent this from a becoming vulnerability, a verification mechanism can be added on S k where the user's login request message can be checked in advance. By doing this, large amounts of attack requests can be filtered out, and then S k and CS, but especially CS, can preserve their computational resources. Therefore, Sood et al.'s scheme cannot prevent DoS/DDoS attack such as resource exhaustion attack.
Stolen smart card attack
There is existing research showing that all existing smart cards cannot prevent stored information from being extracted [5, 8] . This means once a smart card is stolen by an attacker, the attacker can extract the stored information without knowing any passwords. Suppose there is a legitimate user U a in Sood et al.'s scheme. U a can gather information {D a , D a , F a , G ||N 1 ') . U a does not possess ID i so it cannot complete the rest of the protocol to compute the common session key SK = H(H (ID i ||y i ||N 1 )||(N 1 N 2 N 3 ) ). As an attacker, U a only needs to be successful in faking U i enough to fool CS to accept his login request. It follows that Sood et al.'s scheme cannot withstand the stolen smart card attack such as power analysis attack from privileged insiders.
Stolen verifier table attack
Social engineering is the act of manipulating people into performing actions or divulging confidential information, rather than by electronically breaking in or using technical cracking techniques. In Sood et al.'s scheme, if one or both of the verification tables such as the client or service provider server's databases are compromised by social engineering or human hacking and if the attacker also has the knowledge of the control server's master secret x, then the malicious attacker can perform an offline dictionary attack by verifying {C i , y i x} in the client database or {SID k , SK k H(x||SID k )} in the service provider server's database.
Stolen client's database attack
Assuming the client database is compromised perhaps by social engineering or human hacking and the attacker U a , who also has knowledge of the control server's master secret x. U a can perform the following steps: victim user U i , and send the request message to S k to impersonate U i . As we know, U a is successful in faking U i as long as the control server CS accepts his login request.
Stolen service provider server's database attack
Assume the service provider server's database is compromised by social engineering or human hacking by an attacker U a , who also possess the control server's master secret x. To compromise the system, U a can perform the following steps: 
Symbol Misuse
In [10] , after Step 3 of Section 5.3, Sood et al. wrote that "Otherwise, the CS generates random nonce value N 3 , computes: (N 1 N 3 N 3 )|| H(ID i ||y i ||N 1 ) ), and T i = N 2 N 3 H(y i ||ID i ||H(x)||N 1 ) and sends the message {K i , X i , V i , T i } back to S k ." However, the authors misuse the symbol ID i . In fact, since the proposed scheme is a dynamic identity based authentication protocol with user's anonymity, the control server CS does not have any knowledge about the i-th user U i 's identity ID i . Therefore, CS is not able to calculate both X i 's and V i 's formulas. Note that, CS only has CID i of U i .
Moreover, if there were indeed a CID i misusing in the corresponding formulas, an attacker, who has logged U i 's login request {SID k *, Z i , CID i , M i } and holds the value of CID i , is able to calculate the common session key SK = H(H(CID i ||y i ||N 1 )|| (N 1 N 2 N 3 ) ) by the manners of our discussion in Session 3.2 and 3.3, and all traffic via the established secure tunnel can be decrypted and recovered.
Conclusion
In this paper, we provide cryptanalysis and reveal the weaknesses of Sood et al.'s improved secure dynamic identity based authentication protocol for multi-server architecture using smart cards. Their scheme is not resistant to DoS/DDoS attack such as resource exhaustion attack or the stolen smart card attack such as power analysis attack from privileged insiders. Moreover, since the verification tables stored on the control server side may be compromised by social engineering or hacking, it is a likely situation that a malicious attacker can perform an off-line dictionary attack by verifying records in the client's or service provider server's database of the Control Server.
